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Fix formatting

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Joshua Boniface 2024-10-25 03:03:06 -04:00
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docs/deployment/provisioner.md
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@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ Since the `VMBuilderScript` runs within its own context but within the PVC Provi
* `daemon_lib.common`: Part of the PVC daemon libraries, provides several common functions, including, most usefully, `run_os_command` which provides a wrapped, convenient method to call arbitrary shell/OS commands while returning a POSIX returncode, stdout, and stderr (a tuple of the 3 in that order). * `daemon_lib.common`: Part of the PVC daemon libraries, provides several common functions, including, most usefully, `run_os_command` which provides a wrapped, convenient method to call arbitrary shell/OS commands while returning a POSIX returncode, stdout, and stderr (a tuple of the 3 in that order).
* `daemon_lib.ceph`: Part of the PVC daemon libraries, provides several commands for managing Ceph RBD volumes, including, but not limited to, `clone_volume`, `add_volume`, `map_volume`, and `unmap_volume`. See the `debootstrap` example for a detailed usage example. * `daemon_lib.ceph`: Part of the PVC daemon libraries, provides several commands for managing Ceph RBD volumes, including, but not limited to, `clone_volume`, `add_volume`, `map_volume`, and `unmap_volume`. See the `debootstrap` example for a detailed usage example.
For safety reasons, the script runs in a modified chroot environment on the hypervisor. It will have full access to the entire / (root partition) of the hypervisor, but read-only. In addition it has read-write access to /dev, /sys, /run, and a fresh /tmp to write to; use /tmp/target (as convention) as the destination for any mounting of volumes and installation. Thus it is not possible to do things like `apt-get install`ing additional programs within a script; any such requirements must be set up before running the script (e.g. via `pvc-ansible`). For safety reasons, the script runs in a modified chroot environment on the hypervisor. It will have full access to the entire `/` (root partition) of the hypervisor, but read-only. In addition it has read-write access to `/dev`, `/sys`, `/run`, and a fresh `/tmp` to write to; use `/tmp/target` (as convention) as the destination for any mounting of volumes and installation. Thus it is not possible to do things like `apt-get install`ing additional programs within a script; any such requirements must be set up before running the script (e.g. via `pvc-ansible`).
⚠️ **WARNING** Of course, despite this "safety" mechanism, it is **very important** to be cognizant that this script runs **as root on the hypervisor system** with **full access to the cluster**. You should **never** allow arbitrary, untrusted users the ability to add or modify provisioning scripts. It is trivially easy to write scripts which will do destructive things - for example writing to arbitrary `/dev` objects, running arbitrary root-level commands, or importing PVC library functions to delete VMs, RBD volumes, or pools. Thus, ensure you vett and understand every script on the system, audit them regularly for both intentional and accidental malicious activity, and of course (to reiterate), do not allow untrusted script creation! ⚠️ **WARNING** Of course, despite this "safety" mechanism, it is **very important** to be cognizant that this script runs **as root on the hypervisor system** with **full access to the cluster**. You should **never** allow arbitrary, untrusted users the ability to add or modify provisioning scripts. It is trivially easy to write scripts which will do destructive things - for example writing to arbitrary `/dev` objects, running arbitrary root-level commands, or importing PVC library functions to delete VMs, RBD volumes, or pools. Thus, ensure you vett and understand every script on the system, audit them regularly for both intentional and accidental malicious activity, and of course (to reiterate), do not allow untrusted script creation!